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Although blockchain has drawn significant 
attention since its introduction in 2008, determinants of 
its adoption remain largely unknown. Relying on the 
Resource-Based View (hereafter, RBV) of the firm as a 
theoretical guide, we investigate whether a firm’s 
business strategy affects its decision on blockchain 
adoption. We split firms into prospectors (risk takers) 
and defenders (interested in cost stability) consistent 
with the business strategy framework to determine if the 
former group is more likely to adopt blockchain.  
Using a sample of 208 firms from 2015 to 2019, we 
find that prospectors are more likely to adopt 
blockchain than defenders. Results suggest blockchain 
brings more net benefits to prospectors than to 
defenders.  The results support RBV and business 
strategy theories and are robust to the consistency test, 
factor analysis, and placebo test. The findings imply that 
the alignment between business strategy and technology 





Miles and Snow’s [1] business strategy framework 
identifies business strategies as a continuum between 
prospector and defender approaches as an identity that 
firms use to differentiate themselves from peers. 
Prospectors follow an innovation strategy, aggressively 
pursue new market opportunities, are risk-taking, and 
have diverse operations, complex structures, and thus 
more decentralized control structure than defenders (e.g. 
3M, Johnson & Johnson, Tesla Motors). Defender firms 
follow a cost leadership strategy, are risk-averse, and 
have centralized decision making (e.g. BIC Corporation, 
Mrs. Fields Inc., Tower International, Inc.) [1]–[4]. 
Prior research finds that firms’ business strategy is 
associated with firm’s information technology (IT) 
policy, and the alignment between business strategy and 
technology policy further improves economic 
performance [5]–[8].  
Blockchain technology provides a unique 
opportunity to test the business strategy framework in 
the context of IT adoption. Blockchain could transform 
a firm’s business model, improving operations [9], but 
at the same time, it presents risks and uncertainties as a 
new IT. Examining the business strategy framework [1] 
in the context of blockchain adoption, prospector firms 
should be more willing to take the adoption risks than 
defender firms, because the benefits are more closely 
aligned with the former group (i.e., innovative, risk-
taking, decentralized decision-making). 
Resource Based View (RBV) of the firm adds an 
additional, theory-based perspective for studying this 
phenomenon. RBV suggests that firms explore external 
opportunities that can achieve core competitive 
advantage in the market [10]. Both RBV theory and 
empirical evidence suggest that if IT is integrated with 
firm’s unique and complementary internal resources, it 
could deliver superior business value [11]–[15]. These 
arguments further support increased blockchain 
adoption likelihood in prospector firms vis-à-vis 
defender firms.  
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect 
of firm’s business strategy on blockchain adoption. 
Examining the relationship between the business 
strategy framework [1] and blockchain adoption would 
fill an important gap in the related academic research. 
Prior management information systems research mainly 
focuses on the alignment between IT policy and firms’ 
innovation strategy, cost efficiency, and risk-bearing 
level [5], [7], [8], [15]. The unique decentralization 
feature of blockchain [16], [17] potentially provides 
firms an additional “fit” to their pre-existing decision-
making structure. Such additional fit differentiates 
firm’s blockchain adoption decision from firm’s general 
IT and innovation strategies, which could be inherently 
pre-determined by business strategy at early stage of 
business. Thus, our study provides additional evidence 
on the effect of business strategy on firms’ technological 
competence and operational decision. 
Anecdotally, the proclaimed advantages and 
importance of blockchain and current adoption status do 





not clearly reconcile. Although blockchain was 
expected to be part of a revolution to disrupt the global 
economy[17]–[21], the adoption of blockchain in the 
private sector has been slow [19]. Guo et al [22] provide 
initial insights on several internal and external factors 
that affect blockchain adoption, including innovation 
level, agency costs, and external monitoring effects, but 
additional research on the topic is needed if blockchain 
is to fulfill its promised benefits.  
 Empirically, we follow Miles and Snow [1] and 
Hsieh et al [23] to calculate a strategy composite and 
identifying prospector and defender firms. We find that 
prospector firms are more likely to adopt blockchain 
than defenders. Consistent with RBV, prospectors are 
more likely to explore blockchain, because it results in 
more core competitive advantages in the market than 
defenders, due to the alignment between blockchain and 
prospector strategy characteristics. The results are 
robust to testing for endogeneity, factor analysis, and a 
placebo test. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. 
Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and develops 
the hypotheses. We then describe the sample and 
research design in Section 3. Section 4 describes the 
empirical results, and Section 5 provides additional 
analyses. Section 6 concludes the study. 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis 
development 
 
2.1. Business strategy 
 
The extant management literature proposes various 
business strategy typologies to identify how firms 
compete in a given industry or market environment to 
achieve a high level of performance[24]–[30]. Common 
business strategies include rate of change to market 
view [1], product differentiation view [25], exploration 
view[29], and cost leadership [30]. Specifically, Miles 
and Snow [1] identify three viable business strategies: 
prospector, analyzer, and defender based on the firm’s 
rate of change in response to the respective products and 
markets.1 Porter [25] classifies firms' business strategy 
into cost leadership and product differentiation. March 
[29] classifies business strategies into exploration and 
exploitation and Treacy and Wiersema [30] identify 
business strategies as operational excellence, product 
leadership, and customer intimacy.  
Among various business strategies typologies, 
Miles and Snow’s [1] work is widely recognized and 
most likely to align with inferences based on the other 
                                                          
1 The fourth strategy, reactor, is not viable and sustainable in the long 
term, because reactors simply react to pressures in the business 
environment forces (McDaniel and Kolari 1987). Hence, reactors 
typologies [4], [27], [31], [31]–[36]. The prospector 
classification can be aligned with the product 
differentiation typology by Porter [25], exploration type 
in March [29], product leadership type in Treacy and 
Wiersema [30]; whereas, the defender classification is 
aligned with cost leadership type in Porter [25], 
exploitation type in March [29], operational excellence 
type in Treacy and Wiersema [30].  
Based on Miles and Snow’s [1] framework, 
prospector and defender firms (henceforth, prospectors 
and defenders, respectively) are the two endpoints of the 
business strategy continuum. Specifically, prospectors 
focus on exploring new products or market 
opportunities through innovation. Defenders focus on 
efficiency in the production and distribution of goods 
and services and succeed in penetrating a narrow market. 
Analyzers are firms that have the characteristics of both 
prospectors and defenders depending on their 
technology efficiency and business environment, for 
example, being more risk-aversion than prospectors but 
also more aggressively pursuing new opportunities than 
defenders [1].  Prior literature mainly focuses on the two 
endpoints of continuum, prospector and defender, 
because they are the most distinguishable in 
organization characteristics [2], [4], [23], [31], [37], 
[38]. Therefore, following prior literature, we limit our 
focus on the prospector and defender strategies, since 
these two strategies differ drastically in terms of their 
technology strategy, investment horizon, risk-bearing 
level, and organizational structure. 
Prior research documents evidence on the 
systematic difference of firms’ operating and reporting 
environment among different business strategies. Lim et 
al [39] find that business strategies affect firm’s 
operating complexity, environmental uncertainty, and 
information asymmetry. Specifically, prospectors have 
less readable disclosures than defenders due to higher 
exposure to operating complexity and environmental 
uncertainty. Similarly, Zhang [40] finds that prospectors 
have less stock price informativeness than defenders. 
Bentley-Goode et al [41] find that prospectors are more 
likely to have weaker internal controls than defenders. 
Bentley et al [4] find that prospectors are more likely to 
experience financial reporting irregularities and require 
more audit effort. Hsieh et al [23] find that prospectors 
face greater ambiguity and report more conservatively 
than defenders. Collectively, prospectors are more 
likely to have uncertainties in the information 
environment and irregularities in their operational 
processes than defenders, which could represent a 
greater need for blockchain.  
lack a consistent strategy, and is often difficult to identify due to the 
ambiguous and inconsistent behavior. Therefore, we focus on only 
the viable strategies. 
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The prior literature also describes how business 
strategy affects firm’s decision-making processes, 
including innovation choices. For example, Higgins et 
al [31] find that prospectors are more likely to engage in 
tax avoidance than defenders due to their higher risk 
bearing. Yuan et al [42] find that compared with 
defenders, prospectors are more likely to take advantage 
of corporate social responsibility due to their 
innovation-oriented strategy, risk-bearing, and long-
term horizon. Specific to innovation choices, Gosselin 
[43] finds that prospectors who have structures that 
adapt to unpredictable and uncertain environments are 
more likely to adopt IT innovations than defenders. 
Blumentritt and Danis [44] find that prospectors put 
more effort into innovation adoption than defenders in 
order to sustain their competitive position. In sum, the 
extant literature provides some support for business 
strategy as an important determinant in innovation (IT 
adoption) decisions. 
 
2.2. Resource-based view of the firm 
 
The RBV of the firm suggests that firms utilize 
internal and external resources to explore external 
opportunities that can achieve, maintain, and improve 
their competitiveness [10]. Firms’ ability to achieve 
strategic fit among the internal and external competitive 
factors facilitates high performance. Such strategic fit 
requires alignment of organizational resources, 
capabilities, and competencies with environmental 
opportunities and threats [24], [45]. Firms have 
heterogenous resources, skills, and capabilities, thus, 
they potentially have different strategies competing with 
one another.  
RBV theory implies that if valuable resources or 
capabilities of the firm can be easily substituted or 
imitated by others, it is unlikely that such resources or 
capabilities could create sustainable competitive 
advantages [10], [46]. Based on this theory, if IT could 
be intimated by competitors, the firm may not enjoy 
sustainable advantages. However, by integrating IT with 
the firm’s unique and complementary internal resources, 
the IT could deliver superior business value [11]–[15], 
[47]. Accordingly, prior research finds a positive 
correlation between strategic alignment, the alignment 
between IT and business strategy [6], [48], [49], and 
firm performance for prospectors. However, defenders 




Blockchain technology was first used by Nakamoto 
[16] as the IT underlying Bitcoin. Blockchain is a 
decentralized public ledger that provides a secure 
infrastructure for transactions among parties without a 
central authority [16]. The main characteristics of 
blockchain are decentralization, strong authentication, 
and tamper-resistance. Decentralization allows all the 
nodes in the system to have access to the entire list of 
information and allow nodes to verify and publish new 
information. Blocks are then periodically appended to 
the end of the blockchain with a timestamp [16]. 
Although in the initial bitcoin system, all users have the 
authority to view, write, and update the information to 
the chain, in many modern applications of blockchain in 
business, namely, private blockchain, each user is pre-
assigned with permissions.  
The nascent literature identifies various benefits 
and shortcomings of blockchain. In terms of perceived 
benefits, blockchain is expected to improve business 
process transparency [51]. The blockchain-based smart 
contract can mitigate information asymmetry, enhance 
market entry and competition, and improve consumer 
surplus [21]. The decentralized nature of blockchain 
implies a database management system without a 
central authority, resulting in a potential revolution in 
the financial industry [52]. For shareholders, blockchain 
records stock ownership and improves shareholders' 
participation in the firm [53]. For auditors, blockchains 
improving clients’ information security and improves 
process efficiency, and further reduce clients’ 
misreporting incentives [20].  
Compared with other database management 
systems and technologies, major advantages of 
blockchain are decentralization and immutability. 
Blockchain decentralizes the power of verification, 
storage, and updates to a group of computers [54], 
mitigating the potentially large issue of competing 
database management system that such systems are still 
heavily dependent on their centralized database. Such a 
decentralized mechanism could vastly reduce the risk of 
a single point computer failure [17] and, at the same 
time, strictly constrained unauthorized change, 
manipulation, or override in the system. Blockchain is 
potentially more efficient in structure with an append-
only, linear transactional database [54] and operates 
with little human intervention [17], [55]. 
Conversely, blockchain adoption also brings on 
various concerns. Although blockchain could increase 
process transparency and facilitate information sharing, 
greater information sharing could result in undesirable 
proprietary costs to firms [54]. Further, the cost and risk 
of switching to blockchain could be significant to firms, 
because of challenges on necessary physical 
infrastructure, technical challenges, regulation 
uncertainties, and organizational suitability [56].  
 
2.4. Hypothesis development 
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Based on RBV theory, the blockchain adoption 
decision depends on whether blockchain can bring 
unique, non-substitutable core competitive advantages 
in the market with existing firm strategies. Consistent 
with both RBV theory and the previous business 
strategy arguments, prospectors are more likely than 
defenders to adopt blockchain for the following reasons. 
First, prospectors focus on innovation and compete on 
new products and new market opportunities that can 
build competitive advantages in the market. Blockchain 
helps build core competitive advantages for firms, such 
as improving the business process transparency [51], 
mitigating information asymmetry [21], improving 
intra-firm collaborations [57], and, most importantly, 
significantly reducing manipulative opportunities and 
manager override by its unique decentralized nature, 
and thus improving firm’s internal controls [54]. Second, 
prospectors are risk-bearing and are better equipped to 
solve uncertainties resulting from new technology 
adoption, compared with defenders who are risk-
aversion and pursue cost stability. Blockchain, as an 
emerging technology that are still at early stage of 
implementation and has few actual application cases, 
still have uncertainties and risks at adoption, such as 
infrastructure challenges, business suitability, 
probability of unsuccessful implementation, and 
regulatory uncertainty [54]. Therefore, prospectors are 
more likely to bear and resolve the risks associated with 
blockchain adoption than defenders.  
Third, blockchain meets the demand of prospectors 
in improving monitor of the decentralized 
organizational structure. Due to the broad product 
portfolio and marketing, prospectors often have 
diversified business operations and numerous operation 
segments, resulting a decentralized organizational 
control, a more relaxed corporate governance, higher 
likelihood of weaker internal control, and more 
unethical behavior and financial reporting irregularities 
[4], [41], [58], [59]. Otley [60] and Dermer [61] suggest 
that firm’s control system should be designed 
specifically to suite the business strategy of the firm.  
Finally, blockchain’s decentralized and immutable 
system is consistent with the broad architecture of 
prospectors. The alignment between business strategy 
and IT strategy contributes to the perceived business 
performance for prospectors [49], [62]. Thus, by 
adopting blockchain, prospectors could be perceived as 
innovators in the market, facilitate business 
performance, and achieve efficiency and 
competitiveness. Therefore, in sum, prospectors are 
likely to adopt blockchain technology due to its core 
competitive advantages, risk-taking nature of prospector 
business strategy, and organizational structure 
alignment.  
We argue that defenders are less likely to adopt 
blockchain for the following reasons. First, defenders 
pay more attention to technology efficiency of 
blockchain. The firms tend to follow a cost-
minimization strategy and pursue efficiency in 
producing and distributing goods and services. To 
achieve high efficiency in production and distribution, 
defenders focus on technological efficiency instead of 
technological flexibility. While blockchain technologies 
bring various benefits, significant costs related to 
blockchain, including substantial challenges in 
establishing infrastructure and high switching costs, 
could hinder its technological efficiency [54] and thus 
reduce defenders’ incentives to adopt.  
Second, defenders are more risk-inverse [1]. Thus, 
they are more likely to avoid the risk and uncertainties 
like unsuccessful technology development and 
regulatory uncertainties associated with early-stage 
adoption of blockchain. Third, because defenders focus 
on a narrow market and interrelated product portfolio, 
their organizational control environment is often 
centralized, inconsistent with the decentralized nature of 
blockchain. In aggregate, concern about technology 
efficiency of blockchain, risk inversion, and 
misalignment between organizational structure and 
blockchain nature, are all arguments consistent with 
defenders being less likely to adopt blockchain. 
However, regardless of the alignment between 
prospector characteristics and blockchain features, 
prospectors could still be hold back by the proprietary 
costs from blockchain adoption. Increased information 
sharing of blockchain brings potential increased 
proprietary costs. The proprietary cost could be 
especially high for prospectors because prospectors gain 
competitiveness from new products and markets, 
containing more proprietary information than a narrow 
and mature market for defenders. Therefore, a 
significant increase in proprietary cost may reduce the 
cost-benefit efficiency of blockchain adoption and 
hinder prospectors’ incentives to adopt blockchain. 
Given the above discussion comparing prospectors 
and defenders, and the related arguments stemming 
from the business strategy framework [1] and RBV of 
the firm [10] literatures, we hypothesize following: 
H1: Prospectors are more likely to adopt 
blockchain than defenders. 
Based on Miles and Snow [1] business strategy 
framework, prospectors focus on technology flexibility 
while defenders focus on technology efficiency. 
Prospectors pursue technology flexibility to react to new 
opportunities and market rapidly. However, due to the 
cost of technology implement and associated risks, 
prospectors are hard to achieve technology efficiency. 
Defenders focus on the cost efficiency of its 
technologies [1]. Different business strategy results in 
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the variation in technology policy, and hence affects the 
technology decision making. Therefore, we investigate 
whether the technology efficiency is one of the channels 
that business strategy affects blockchain adoption. 
H2: Firms that have higher technology efficiency 
are less likely to adopt blockchain. 
 
3. Research design 
 
3.1. Sample Selection 
 
We hand-collected a sample of blockchain 
adoptions from the fiscal year 2015 to 2019. We first 
searched for firms’ 6-K, 8-K, 8-K, 10-K, 10-Q, 20-F, 
40-F filings and identify those that have disclosure 
contains the words “blockchain” and “block chain.” we 
then review each document to determine whether the 
firm actually adopts blockchain and the date or month 
of adoption. We select the earliest mention of 
blockchain adoption if mentions in multiple documents 
occur. After initial disclosure, we treat the firm as 
adopted even if no further disclosure is made, unless 
additional disclosure specifically mentioned the firm 
stops blockchain implementation. Blockchain adoption 
firms are matched to Compustat and Audit Analytics by 
Central Index Key (CIK). The final blockchain adoption 
sample includes 208 blockchain adopting firms from the 
fiscal year 2015 to 2019. After including all non-
blockchain adopting firm-year observations with all 
available financial information to construct variables, 





Following Guo et al [22] and Cheng et al. [18], we 
define blockchain as an indicator variable that equals 1 
starting the year that the firm discloses actual adoption 
of blockchain, and zero otherwise.  
Following Bentley et al [4], Higgins et al. [31], and 
Hsieh et al [23], we construct the composite business 
strategy measure using six firm characteristics: (1) the 
ratio of R&D expense to total sales, (2) the ratio of 
employees to sales, (3) the one-year sales growth rate, 
(4) the ratio of selling, general, and administrative 
expenses to total sales, (5) the standard deviation of the 
number of employees, and (6) net property, plant, and 
equipment scaled by total assets. We calculate all six 
variables using a rolling five-year average and then rank 
each variable into quintiles within each Fama-French 12 
industry-year to minimize the effect of industry driven 
factors. For example, certain industries have higher 
ratios in general, such as pharmaceutical firms, which 
would be considered more risky than utility firms. Firms 
with the highest value (top quintile) are assigned with a 
score of 5, while the lowest quintile firms are assigned 
a score of 1. For each firm year, we add up the scores 
for each of the six variables. The sum of scores is 
STRATEGY measure, which ranges from 6 (all six 
factors are ranked as 1) to 30 (all six factors are ranked 
as 5). A higher value of STRATEGY indicates that 
firms follow the prospector strategy; whereas, a lower 
value of STRATEGY indicates that firms follow the 
defender strategy. Following Hsieh et al (2018), we 
further create a dummy variable (PROSPECTOR) that 
equals one if the score is greater than 18 and zero 
otherwise.  
we then match prospector firms with defender firms 
with the propensity score matching method as shown in 
Eq. (1). Matching by propensity score can potentially 
eliminate a great portion of biased treatment effects and 
create a balanced dataset, allowing a direct comparison 
of baseline covariates between prospector and defender. 
We use caliper matching with the width of 0.01 and 
without replacement to match prospector to defender 
firms [63]–[65]. Accordingly, we fit a first-stage logistic 
regression that matches the prospector and defender as 
a function of firm fundamental and performance control 
variables in Eq. (1). 
Following Guo et al [22], we control for firm size, 
which equals to natural logarithm of firm’s total assets, 
and firm profitability, including return on assets and loss. 
Return on assets equals to firms’ income before 
extraordinary items scaled by firm’s total assets in 
current fiscal year. Loss equals 1 if firm suffer a 
negative income in the current year and 0 otherwise. We 
also control for firm’s growth opportunities - market to 
book ratio, which equals the ratio of firm’s market value 
of equity to firm’s book value of equity. We further 
control firms’ leverage ratio, tangibility ratio, and 
operating cash flow to control for firm’s financial health 
condition, where leverage ratio equals to firms’ total 
debt divided by total assets, tangibility ratio equals ratio 
of net property, plant, and equipment to total assets, and 
operating cash flow equals to firms’ operating cash flow 
scaled by total assets. Lastly, we control for firm’s 
innovation investment, R&D by control firm’s R&D 
expenses scaled by lagged total assets. Further, we 
control year and Fama-French 12 industry fixed effects 
to mitigate the impact of time-invariant year and 
industry characteristics are also included. 
Pr(Prospector = 1) =  β0 +  β2SIZE +
 β2ROA +  β3LOSS +  β4MTB + β5LEVERAGE +
 β6TANG +  β7OCF +  β8RD +  ε    (1) 
All variables are statistically significant (p<0.01) in 
the PSM model. After matching, the difference between 
prospectors and defenders on fundamental variables are 
no longer significant except MTB ratio and LOSS, 
which are expected because prospectors are more likely 
to have growth opportunities and unstable profitability 
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compared with defenders [1]. Following propensity 
score matching, the final sample consists of 7,237 firm-
year observations including 146 blockchain adoption 
firms. 
Following Chan et al [66] and Lev et al [67], we 
proxy technology efficiency as the ratio of the number 
of patent granted to the total R&D capital spent. 
Specifically, technology efficiency is defined as the 
ratio of firm i’s patents granted in year t (Patentsi,t) 
scaled by the 5-year cumulative R&D expenses 
assuming an annual depreciation rate of 20%. We set 
missing R&D in Compustat to zero and allow a 2-year 
gap between R&D capital and patents issuance because 
of the average 2-year granting period of USPTO (Hall, 
Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001). 
Technology Efficiency = Patentsi,t/(R&Di,t-2+ 0.8R&Di,t-
3+0.6R&Di,t-4+0.4R&Di,t-5+0.2R&Di,t-6) (2) 
 
3.3. Main regression model 
 
To test our hypothesis, we estimate the following 



































HHI+ Year FE + Industry FE + ε   (3) 
In addition to the existing controls in Eq. (1), we 
control for the firm’s fundamentals and performance, 
industry competition, and determinants of blockchain 
adoption from Guo et al [22]. Existing patents 
(PATENT) are measured as the natural log of total 
patents plus one. More patented technologies imply 
higher technological effort by a firm, and more likely 
the firm benefit from blockchain-related knowledge 
flow, and thus firms are more likely to adopt blockchain. 
Managerial discretion (ABS_DA) is calculated based on 
Modified Jones Model [68]. Firms with higher 
managerial discretion may adopt blockchain due to the 
technology hype without a clear understanding of the 
according to costs and risk. Audit delay (LNRLAG) is 
defined as the natural log of the number of days between 
audit opinion release and fiscal year-end. Higher audit 
delay indicates a more complex organizational structure. 
Blockchain could significantly improve efficiency for 
complex firms. We control external monitoring through 
the presence of a Big 4 auditor (BIG4). We control firm 
fundamentals by controlling log transformed assets 
                                                          
2 The results remain quantitative and qualitative similar when we 
divide business strategy into three categories – prospector, analyzer, 
and defenders.  
3 we replace the dependent variable of Eq. (3) with the duration of 
the blockchain adoption, which equals the cumulative year of 
blockchain adoption, to investigate whether prospectors are more 
(SIZE), firm debt to assets ratio (LEVERAGE), market 
to book ratio (MTB), operating cash flow (OCF), PP&E 
to assets ratio (TANG), research and development 
expenses (RD), and control for firm performance by 
controlling firm income before extraordinary items to 
assets ratio (ROA) and occurrence of negative net 
income (LOSS). We also controlled for the industry 
competition level (Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, HHI) 
that the firm faces to control for the potential peer 
pressure on blockchain adoption. Year and Fama-
French 12 industry fixed effects are controlled to 
mitigate the impact of time-invariant year and industry 
characteristics. 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
In the propensity-matched sample, 208 of the 
sample firm adopt blockchain. Overall, 66% of the 
sample use Big 4 auditors. 66% of the firms earn a profit, 
and the median return on assets is 0.533, indicating that 
most of the sample firms are profitable. On average, 
firms in the sample have a leverage ratio of 0.317. With 
propensity score matching, the differences between 
prospector and defender are alleviated (p>0.1) and thus 
mitigate potential bias towards the covariant estimate. 
For Pearson correlation among variables, the 
STRATEGY is positively associated with blockchain 
adoption (0.023, p<0.01), indicating that prospectors are 
more likely to adopt blockchain. All significant pair-
wise correlations are less than 0.50; we also conduct 
multicollinearity tests and find that VIFs for the 
independent variables are well below 2.5. Therefore, 
multicollinearity should not be a concern in our setting.  
Table 1 present the main regression results for the 
relationship between business strategy and blockchain 
adoption. In the first two columns, the estimated 
coefficient on STRATEGY is positive and statistically 
significant (0.138, p<0.05), indicating that prospectors 
are more likely to adopt blockchain. Further, we replace 
the STRATEGY variable with the binary variable 
PROSPECTOR and the result remains the same (0.691, 
p<0.1). Combined, the results support H1 that 
prospectors are more likely to adopt blockchain than 
defenders2. Consistent with prior studies, audit lag is 
positive and significantly associated with blockchain 
adoption, indicating that complex firms are more likely 
to gain competitive advantages from blockchain 
adoption. Patent and managerial discretion are 
positively associated with blockchain adoption3.  
likely to early adopt blockchain than defenders. Untabulated results 
show that the positive and significant coefficient on both 
STRATEGY (0.001, t = 2.345) and PROSPECTOR (0.006, t = 
1.812) provide consistent results that prospectors are timelier in 
blockchain adoption than defenders even when both prospectors and 
defenders consider adopting blockchain. 
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Comparing the means of technology efficiency of 
prospectors to the efficiency of defenders, defenders 
have statistically significantly higher mean of 
technology efficiency than prospectors (diff = -0.019, t 
= -4.350, p < 0.01), consistent with the business strategy 
framework [1]. Further, as expected, Column (3) shows 
a negative significant coefficient on technology 
efficiency (-62.464, p < 0.01), indicating a negative 
relationship between technology efficiency and 
blockchain adoption. The finding supports H2 that 
defenders who focus on technology efficiency are less 
likely to adopt blockchain than prospectors. 
Table 1 Logit Regression – Analysis of 
Blockchain Adoption and Business Strategy 


















   
(-2.926) 
PATENT 0.173 0.121 1.022***  
(0.941) (0.669) -3.244 
AEM_DA 0.225 0.366 -1.955  
(0.434) (1.482) (-1.132) 
LNRLAG 1.638*** 1.484*** 0.834  
(3.239) (3.526) (0.321) 
BIG4 0.159 0.052 2.636**  
(0.236) (0.091) (2.277) 
SIZE 0.188 0.131 -0.169  
(1.199) (1.015) (-0.715) 
ROA -0.019 -0.283 -1.881  
(-0.094) (-0.830) (-1.256) 
LOSS 1.111** 0.818* 1.897**  
(2.301) (1.899) (2.502) 
MTB -0.007 0.008 -0.071***  
(-0.383) (0.559) (-3.247) 
LEVERAGE -5.122*** -3.305*** -3.907***  
(-4.965) (-2.949) (-4.414) 
TANG 1.24 1.468* 2.988  
(1.263) (1.756) (1.215) 
OCF -0.801 -0.428 -1.476**  
(-1.298) (-0.562) (-2.413) 
RD -22.559*** -15.533*** -28.069***  
(-3.455) (-2.853) (-3.432) 
HHI -5.799 -16.419 -4.242  
(-0.229) (-0.591) (-1.366) 
Constant -14.793*** -11.695*** -8.599 
  (-4.635) (-4.330) (-0.755) 
N 7,237 7,237 7,237 
Psuedo R2 0.213 0.219 0.375 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level using 
reported t-values based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors 
adjusting for clustering at industry and year level. t-statistics are 
reported in parenthesis. Year and industry fixed effects are controlled. 
 
5. Additional analysis 
 
It is possible that there are omitted variables that are 
correlated with both business strategy and blockchain 
adoption, and thus causing endogeneity problems. We 
argue that the endogeneity problem is less likely in the 
study due to the consistency in firm business strategy 
[32]. Organizational theory [1] posits that when 
companies adopt a particular business strategy, the 
strategy should remain consistent over time. 
Consistently, prior literature also suggests that a firms’ 
business strategy is determined at an early stage and 
remains relatively stable over time [27], [69]. Therefore, 
we expect prospectors and defenders have relatively 
stable STRATEGY scores over time.  
Following Bentley et al [4], to examine the 
consistency of the sample firms’ business strategy, we 
first analyze the variance of the STRATEGY measure 
within companies that have at least two consecutive 
years observations. Consistent with prior studies, 
untabulated results suggest that 5.71% of sample firms 
have STRATEGY scores that never change for the 
whole sample period, and the mean (median) variance 
of STRATEGY is 1.275 (0.667). We then run the first 
difference for each firm-year STRATEGY score to 
determine how many times a company changes the 
score from year to year in the whole sample period. 
Untabulated results show that 43.79% of firm-year 
observations did not change scores from year to year (i.e. 
from 2018 to 2019), and 39.77% of firm-year 
observations change score by only one unit (i.e., 
changing from 24 to 23) from year to year. Less than 2 
percent of firms change score by more than 3 unit-score. 
Further, the untabulated correlation between the current 
year STRATEGY and last year STRATEGY is positive 
and significant at 1 percent level (coefficient = 0.913, p 
< 0.001). In sum, consistent with organizational theory, 
the sample firms have a stable STRATEGY score over 
time, and thus a firm’s business strategy could be treated 
as an underlying factor of blockchain adoption. 
To assess whether STRATEGY represents a 
construct that provides incremental information than its 
six individual components, we conduct component 
analysis following Bentley et al (2013). First, we re-
estimated Eq. (1) with the six raw components of the 
STRATEGY measure but removed the RD variable due 
to multicollinearity issue with the RDS component in 
the STRATEGY score. The coefficients on all 
individual components are not significant (maximum t 
of the six components = 1.183, maximum p < 0.1) and 
the components’ signs are not always consistent with the 
sign of the composite STRATEGY measure.  
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Further, we perform factor analysis on all six raw 
components of STRATEGY, and the results show that 
all items load on one factor. Consistent with the 
organizational theory which evaluates the components 
relative to industry competitors, we create factor scores 
of six raw components by industry-year, and re-estimate 
Eq. (1) by replacing the discrete dependent variable with 
the factor score. Coefficient on factor score remains 
positive and significant (0.026, t = 2.987, p < 0.01).  
Additionally, we conduct a placebo test to address 
the concern that our results might be driven by other 
unobservable factors that are not controlled in our 
specifications. We first randomly assign prospector 
groups and then re-estimate Eq (1) with RANDOM_ 
PROSPECTOR. If our main results are not driven by the 
business strategy but by other unobservable factors, we 
should observe a positive and significant coefficient on 
RANDOM_PROSPECTOR. If the driver is business 
strategy variation, we should not observe a significant 
coefficient on the RANDOM_ PROSPECTOR. To 
ensure this procedure is truly random, we repeat the 
random assignment procedure 1000 times.  
The coefficient on RANDOM_PROSPECTOR is 
not significant, with maximum possible t-statistics 
equals to -0.256 (p < 0.1), indicating that the previously 
documented results are driven by business strategy 
variation, rather than the omitted factors that are not 
specified. Thus, the main result is robust to the placebo 




This study investigates whether a firm’s business 
strategy affects a firm’s decision on blockchain 
adoption. We find that not only prospectors, who risk-
taking, innovation-oriented are more likely to adopt 
blockchain than defenders, who are efficiency-oriented. 
The results are therefore consistent with the RBV and 
business strategy theoretical framework. Main results 
remain consistent in the endogeneity test and factor 
analysis, and the placebo test shows insignificant results, 
providing additional support to the results. 
Our study links three research literatures: the 
business strategy literature, RBV theory, and IT 
adoption/blockchain research. First, our study 
contributes to the business strategy literature by 
investigating how it can affect a firm’s innovation and 
IT adoption choices. The results add a new context to 
the prior literature, where the focus is on how business 
strategy significantly impacts a firm’s financial 
disclosure choice and operating activities, such as 
financial reporting irregularity, accounting 
conservatism, tax aggressiveness, and auditor’s risk 
assessment [23], [31], [32], [41]. Complementing prior 
research which focusing on the impact of business 
strategy on financial disclosure, our study focuses on the 
impact of business strategy on firm’s non-financial 
behavior, namely, firm’s blockchain adoption decision.  
Second, RBV theory [10] suggests that the variance 
of existing resources among firms result in 
heterogenous external opportunities among firms. Due 
to such variance of internal resources, the alignment 
between each external opportunity and firms’ internal 
resources varies from firm to firm. Firms with higher 
alignment with a specific IT are more likely to pursue 
adoption. Our study extends RBV by combining its 
central ideas with the business strategy framework [1] - 
the alignment between blockchain (external opportunity) 
and business strategy (internal resource) decides 
potential benefits that blockchain could bring to the firm, 
and thus affects firms’ decision on blockchain adoption. 
Third, prior blockchain literature either focuses on 
the effect of managerial opportunistic behavior related 
to blockchain, such as speculative blockchain 
disclosures or opportunistic blockchain-related name 
change[18], [70], instead of actual blockchain adoption, 
or provide internal and external factors that affects 
blockchain adoption, such as firm patent capability, 
agency costs, accounting complexity, and external 
monitoring effects from analysts and auditors [22]. Our 
study adds to the literature by focusing on the factor that 
is early determined at the beginning stage of a business, 
remains consistent over time, and affects every aspect of 
business fundamental structure and subsequent 
operating decisions [1], for instance, innovation strategy 
and IT adoption. Our results imply that, despite the 
internal and external factors documented in prior studies, 
business strategy may have already built firms’ inherent 
characteristics at the early stage, influencing the fit 
between firms’ business situation and blockchain, and 
hence affects firms’ strategy on blockchain adoption. 
Further, the study also has practical implications for 
managers to help them decide whether blockchain is 
suitable for the firm’s current situation. Managers may 
need to consider the alignment between firms’ current 
business strategy and blockchain when they make a 
decision on adoption. This study is also informative to 
investors on the risk and advantages of blockchain 
adoption, and what types of firms are more likely to 
adopt new technologies. This study also has 
implications for regulators by providing further 
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